place in central Florida and its value is directly related to cold weather in the region. Roll examined futures contract prices for concentrated orange juice and found that if the closing futures price is higher than its opening price, a more accurate prediction of a freeze can be made by adjusting downward the National Weather Service's temperature forecast.
Prediction markets are special case of asset markets (see Noussair and Tucker this issue for a discussion) where the value of the traded asset is contingent upon the outcome of some uncertain event at or before some prespecified point in time and not upon a claim to some underlying asset as in a futures market for orange juice. In more concrete terms, suppose there is an asset that will pay $0 if event A occurs, $2 if event B occurs and $3 if event C occurs. If some traders have certain information that event A will not occur and other traders have certain information that event B will not occur, then if they pooled (aggregated) their information they would know that event C is a certainty and the asset should be worth $3. The question is whether a market in which such an asset was trading would arrive at the $3 price, thus effectively aggregating the information and letting everyone know that event C will occur.
One of the most well-known and well-studied prediction markets is the Iowa Electronic Market for US Presidential Elections. In this market a trader can pay $1 to purchase a pair of shares.
Essentially, one share pays $1 if the Democratic candidate wins the popular vote in the US next presidential election and $0 otherwise. The other share has a similar payoff structure for the Republican candidate.
2 At the time this is being written the market price for the democrat 2 Technically, the shares payoff if that party's candidate receives the majority of the votes cast for one of those two parties. That is votes for other parties are not considered. The Iowa Electronic Market also operates markets for the vote share in US presidential elections as well as markets for Congressional election outcomes and stated Federal Reserve Policies.
share is 0.60 indicating a 60% chance that the democratic candidate, Barak Obama, will receive the majority of the popular vote in the 2012 election. Over the last several presidential election cycles, the Iowa Electronic Market has been found to outperform more traditional means of aggregating opinions of candidates such as opinion polls (Berg, et al. 2003) . In particular, they examine national polls for the 1988 through 2004 U.S. Presidential elections versus synchronous vote share market prices. The result of the exercise finds that over 964 polls during this time period, the market is closer to the eventual outcome 74% of the time in the vote share markets (see Figure 1 , which is taken from Arrow, et al. 2008) . Similar exercises have been carried out by Wolfers and Leigh (2002) for local elections in Australia and Pennock et al. (2001) for box office receipts in the Hollywood Exchange 3 and both document the relative accuracy of prediction markets. Prediction markets are now used in a wide variety of settings. In particular, many firms have begun experimenting with internal prediction markets to gauge forecasts of events important to the firm. For example, Chen and Plott (2002) developed prediction markets for HewlettPackard Corporation (HP) to forecast sales of products (monthly dollar sales or units sold, three months in the future). There were between 20 to 30 market participants who were firm employees in marketing and finance. They found that the market prices outperformed official HP forecasts. Google has been using prediction market on a large scale since 2005 with its employees. Participants in the Google markets are given an amount of artificial currency ("Goobles") to buy and sell "securities" in specific events that pays off in Goobles. The markets were designed to forecast product launch dates, new office openings, and many other items of strategic importance to Google. Cowgill (2009) found that the while Google markets were reasonably good at predicting events, there was a tendency towards optimism. In addition, this optimism was even more pronounced on days in which Google stock did well.
Other companies are now starting to experiment with prediction markets for their own forecasting elements.
The largest public prediction market in the world is Intrade.com and it offers contracts on scientific discoveries, the economy, current events, and geo-political relationships. Prediction markets have even been used to forecast outbreaks of contagious diseases (Polgreen, et al. 2007 ) and the number of cattle being brought to slaughter (Gallardo 2009 Arrow, et al. 2008) .
One of the main obstacles to the implementation of prediction markets, other than concerns about running afoul of gambling laws, is concern about the degree to which they can be manipulated. Setting Federal Reserve Bank policy or National Security policy with systems that can be manipulated is clearly problematic. However, previous attempts to manipulate existing markets have been largely unsuccessful at creating nontransitory price movement: "The profit motive has usually proven sufficient to ensure that attempts at manipulating these [prediction] markets were unsuccessful." (Wolfers and Zitsewitz, 2004, p. 119) . Wolfers and Leigh (2002) discuss failed attempts by political candidates to manipulate markets predicting their own success. 4 Also looking at political prediction markets, Rhode and Strumph (2009, p. 37) conclude that "In almost every speculative attack, prices experienced measurable initial changes. However, these movements were quickly reversed and prices returned close to their previous levels."
In order for the prices in a prediction market to aggregate information there has to be a relationship between prices and traders beliefs. From a theoretical perspective there can be a divergence between mean beliefs and the equilibrium price (see Manski 2006 ). This divergence is tempered when traders are risk averse (see Gjerstad 2005) . In this paper we see the ability of prediction markets to aggregate information or be manipulated as an empirical question and as such our focus is on the results from laboratory experiments.
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The Success of Markets Aggregating Information Plott and Sunder (1988) introduced what has become the classic information aggregation experiment. Like many previous experiments up to that point, their market used a double auction mechanism due to the demonstrated success this institution had in other environments and the dynamic opportunity for traders to adjust their behavior as bids and asks entered the market (as opposed to the static nature of institutions such as a sealed bid offer market where a trader could not update his choices based upon feedback from the market within the period).
The traders were all endowed with a large amount of cash and a fixed number of shares. So that profits were tied only to trading and asset dividends, the cash was treated as a loan which had to be repaid at the end of trading. Shares paid dividends to whoever held them when trading was done, but the dividend amount depended upon which of three possible states of the world (denoted X, Y, and Z) was realized and the type of the trader who held the asset (with type being defined by state dependent dividend payoff structure). Prior to trading, Plott and Sunder (1988) In total, Plott and Sunder (1988) report the results of 11 sessions totaling 175 markets, each somewhat different from the others including the school from which the subjects were recruited, the number of trader types, the dividend values for each type, the number of traders, endowments, and shares as well as the experience level of the subjects, the duration of the experiment, and whether or not short sales were allowed. 7 This heterogeneity in the experimental design makes it somewhat difficult to identify the specific effects of any particular aspect of the market, but the researchers classify the markets into three series. In series A, there was only a single class of asset and there were always multiple types of traders. A rational for having multiple types is that trading should occur in equilibrium as shares are moved from those who value them least to those who value them most. If everyone had the same value for the shares, then there may be little incentive for any trading to occur. For these series A markets, Plott and Sunder (1988) find that information is not well aggregated and efficiency is lower than the rational expectation model would predict. However, they do find 7 In this experiment, when short sales were allowed, traders had to subsequently buy shares in order to cover the short sales or had to pay an extremely large penalty.
that the allocations and profits are generally consistent with the rational expectations model in the last occurrence of a particular dividend state. Plott and Sunder (1988) find stronger support for the rational expectations model in their two other sets of markets. In series B the assets are state contingent. Thus rather than trading a single asset that pays off one of three possible dividend amounts, subjects are trading three assets, each of which payoff in a single state. For example, the X asset pays a positive dividend in state X, but does not have a payoff in states Y or Z. In series C there is only a single type of trader. That both of these sets of markets produce results that are generally consistent with rational expectations and have prices that reflect aggregated information are important for prediction markets, because most such markets operate with both state dependent assets and a uniform dividend structure.
"Success" in these and other laboratory markets is defined by the rational expectations model, where all of the information is aggregated into the market price, outperforming more myopic models. This should not be construed to mean that all trades occur at the price level that reflects all of the disparate information held by the traders. Indeed, when trading begins there is only private information and it takes time and trading activity for bids, asks, and contracts to reflect more than a trader's private information. For this reason, one would expect prices to move towards the full information level during the course of trading. Thus, researchers typically focus on closing prices rather than starting or average prices. The starting location and speed of convergence likely depend on a wide variety of factors from the distribution of information to the risk attitudes of the traders. Further, market prices are likely to experience variability and often do not obtain the theoretically predicted price even at the end of the trading horizon, a fact that may be lost in some of the rhetoric of prediction markets. Figure 2 shows the observed behavior in one of the series C sessions, where one can clearly see these behavioral patterns. This figure plots contract prices over the course of the experiment blocked by market period with the true state shown in parenthesis and the average price given above the chart. The thick / dashed / dotted lines denote the Rational Expectations / Prior Information / Maximin model price predictions.
8 Figure 2 . Market 7 from Plott and Sunder (1988) Noting that Plott and Sunder's (1988) success had come when the market involved a complete set of contingent claims or when preferences were identical, Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) set out to identify conditions under which a single security would obtain the price predicted by the rational expectations model when traders had diverse preferences. As such Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) closely follow Plot and Sunder (1988) in most respects (endowments of cash and shares, no short sales, double auction, etc.). They conducted two sets of experiments:
8 The prior Information model assumes that traders update their beliefs after observing the private signal according to Bayes rule and act upon this probability to maximize their expected payoff. The maximin model assumes that traders will not purchase an asset unless the price is below the minimum possible value the trader knows the asset could take with certainty.
what they call "better chance" and what one might call more challenging. As the name indicates the better chance markets "were designed to give the (Rational Expectations) model a better chance for success…" (p. 311). In these markets, the two dividend structures were common information, unlike in the prior study. Also unlike the prior study, subjects gained experience by participating with the same group on two different days with everyone switching dividend structures on the second day.
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By and large, by the end of the first day (12 to 15 market periods) trading did not successfully aggregate information as observed prices varied little with the true state. By the second day behavior did conform to the rational expectations model, at least for closing prices in the last few market periods. However, earlier on the second day closing prices are often better described by a private information model. For example in "Market 4" with experienced traders, shown in Figure 2 , the prior information model outperforms the rational expectations model in periods 1, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, and 18 . Had this session only lasted 17 periods like the other three once experienced better chance markets, the authors would not have been able to tout the success of the rational expectations model "by the last occurrence of each state" in all these sessions. Again, when information aggregation occurs in the market, it does so through trading so the initial prices are based upon private information and other idiosyncratic aspects 9 Of course there were several other differences as well including intentional ones such as the use of a mechanized device to select the true state each period and unintentional ones such as the subject pools (in this case MBA and undergraduate students at a different school). This second point is not meant as a criticism, but as a reminder that pure replication is never possible. Things like the room temperature, the gender of the researcher, or the time of day are not normally reported in experiments, but any of these features could add variation in observed behavior. Thus, it is important for a wider variety of researchers to conduct similar variations of important results and that one should be cautious with regards to any single study, but can feel comfortable with results that are shown to be robust. Thus, the similarity in the results between Plott and Sunder (1988) and the inexperienced subjects in Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) better chance markets despite the slight variations gives greater confidence in the reliability of the behavior.
of the traders. During a market period prices tend to move from a common starting point towards the rational expectations price conditional on the true state. Casual inspection of the relevant figures in Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) reveal that the speed of convergence within a period varies wildly, but often the average price and the closing price are not close, see Figure   3 . In this figure the legend is the same as in Figure 2 , but trading volume and total efficiency by period have been added to the top of the chart. From the better chance markets the authors conclude that experience, common knowledge of the dividend structure and of trader types, and relatively thick markets are sufficient for the rational expectations predictions to be accurate. Experience took two forms in the better chance markets: one was familiarity with the trading institution and market operations and the other was having participated as a trader with the alternative dividend structure. To explore this last feature the authors conducted some "constant type" experiments where the traders retained the same dividend structure both days, but still had common information regarding both dividend structures. The results were similar to the better chance markets and the authors conclude that switching types is not necessary for convergence.
Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) also conducted a series of experiments where they removed the common information about dividends so that a trader only knows his or her own private payoff for each state. In these "no common knowledge" treatment market prices do not reflect information aggregation indicating that common dividend information is necessary. Fortunately for advocates of prediction markets the traded assets pay the same dividend to everyone and thus the dividend structure is common information. Additionally, Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) conducted "experience and random type" sessions where subjects were twice experienced having participated in one of the pairs of better chance sessions and where the dividend type was randomly assigned in each market. In these cases, closing prices again converged to the rational expectations predictions by the end session, but average prices throughout the day and closing prices in early markets did not. From this, the authors conclude that repeated experience with the same people and a fixed dividend structure are not necessary for the success of the rational expectations model. The former is important for prediction markets given the way they are normally operationalized in practice.
More recently, Bodsky (2012) considers the case where two states of the world are possible, but traders only observe a noisy signal of the true state. In these experiments, subjects were shown two distributions of marbles, which were deposited into identical bags. One of the bags was then randomly selected and subjects had to predict which one had been chosen. Subjects were endowed with cash and shares of two types of contingent assets, one for each possible bag that could have been selected. Each subject privately observed a single draw from the selected bag and could trade with the other participants based upon this private information.
This process was repeated so that each subject ultimately observed several draws from the selected bag. 10 Subjects were also asked to state their subjective probabilistic belief about which bag had been drawn. Bodsky (2012) found considerable variation in behavior, with most, but not all sessions pricing the assets near the Bayesian predictions.
Comparisons of Predication Markets with Other Mechanisms for Information Aggregation
The demonstrated success and popularity of (double auction) markets for aggregating information has led to it being a standard of comparison for other institutions such as surveys or scoring rules. 11 Graefe (2010) argues that prediction markets outperform surveys when judgment is needed. However, Rieg and Schoder (2012) find little justification for the use of prediction markets, which may be more costly to operate, in comparison to surveys. They use two lab experiments and an online study. Each experiment compares a double auction, a scoring rule, and a survey. In the two lab experiments, subjects predict the outcomes of soccer games while the researchers vary the diversity of information and do not allow entry/exit nor do they allow users to do research. In the online experiment, entry/exit, information diversity, and information search are not controlled. They find that all of the procedures yield similar accuracy in the lab experiments, a finding similar to earlier work reported in Rieg and Schoder 10 This process is similar to Camerer (1987) except that information was private. The point of the Camerer experiments was to see if the market would correctly price the assets and in general the market price was similar to the price that would be obtained under Bayesian updating. 11 Chen and Pennock (2010) provide a detailed survey of the various types of institutions for aggregating information.
(2010). However, in the online experiments, they concluded that the market is less accurate, which they attribute in part to difficulty in maintaining ongoing participation in markets. Graefe and Armstrong (2010) also compare prediction markets and surveys as well as other methods such as face-to-face meetings. In addition to finding little evidence that prediction markets outperform other methods of making a forecast, they report that participants were least satisfied with the process when engaging in prediction markets. Healy, et al. (2012) compare pari-mutuel betting with double auction markets. 12 They find that in simple environments where there is a single event with a binary state, the double auction performs relatively well even though their markets are very thin involving only three traders.
This result is also encouraging for many prediction markets which tend to focus on single events and may operate with relatively small numbers of traders. In their study, subjects observe "several flips" of one of two possible "biased coins" and try to predict the chance that a future flip will be heads. Healy, et al. (2012) also find that in more complicated environments where there are multiple correlated information states the double auction does not perform as well.
Instead, they find that the Delphi or iterated poll method is superior not only outperforming the double auction and pari-mutuel betting, but also outperforming the market scoring rule of Hanson (2003) . 13 Of course, these results are all conditional on the very thin three person markets used in the study.
12 Plott, et al (2003) also study pari-mutual betting markets. They find mixed success for these systems in aggregating information as predicted by the rational expectations model. 13 Blohm, et al. (2012) use experimental markets with scoring rules in a two (single market v multiple market) by three (levels of elasticity) experimental design. They find that multiple markets improve efficiency, but that the impact of a change in elasticity depends on the number of markets and the level of elasticity. Ledyard, et al. (2009) Together these papers suggest that prediction markets are not universally the best choice.
Rather, it is important to identify when prediction markets are a good choice. The answer depends at least in part on the extent of the robustness of these markets to insiders or manipulators.
How Do Insiders Impact Markets?
14 There was a single market for each event (event A occurs), rather than two markets (A occurs and A does not occur) as short sales were allowed. 15 Klingert and Meyer (2012) use simulations to compare continuous double auctions and market scoring. They conclude that market scoring is preferable. Jian and Sami (2012) investigate two forms of a market scoring rule, one in which people directly state their probabilistic beliefs and one in which traders reveal their beliefs by trading assets with an automated market maker. Ultimately they find that both mechanisms perform equally well.
In another seminal paper, Plott and Sunder (1982) report a series of experiments on a market's ability to disseminate information more so than aggregate it. These markets were similar to those in Plott and Sunder (1988) In some market periods of Plott and Sunder (1982) no one received information about the true state, in others only some traders received information and in the remaining markets everyone knew the true state. If a trader has better information then other traders, the informed trader can attempt to exploit this informational advantage, but doing so will reveal (and thus eliminate) the informational advantage. For example, if an individual knows that the price of an asset is too low, then that person should purchase shares in order to take advantage of the situation. In doing so, the trader will bid up the price of the asset until the price reflects this private information. There were several idiosyncrasies across sessions, including an extra possible state in one, fewer traders in another, various numbers of markets in a session, differing patterns of information conditions, and differences in the commonality of information regarding the number of insiders. This heterogeneity again makes it difficult to identify the effects of specific aspects of the experimental design, but in aggregate the results provide general support for the rational expectations model in terms of prices, allocations, efficiency, and profits. Thus, the information that insiders possess is disseminated through the market trading process.
16 Banks (1985) noted that Plott and Sunder (1982) did not vary the identity of the informed traders leading open the possibility that uniformed traders had simply learned who to follow rather than the market having aggregated information. To separate this explanation from the one preferred by Plott and Sunder (1982) , Banks replicated their design except that the identity of the informed traders was randomized each period. The results support the claims of Plott and Sunder with respect to the pricing dynamics, but also indicate that the strength of the results in later periods may have been biased by this feature of the design.
Camerer and Weigelt (1991) also explored a market environment where insiders with perfect information may or may not be present. In most other respects their markets were similar to those previously discussed (traders were endowed with shares and cash, short sales were prohibited, trading via double auction, etc.). Traders knew their own values in each state but not the values of the other traders. In market periods in which there were insiders the identity of those insiders was determined randomly. All of these procedures were common information among the traders. They reported that in markets where insiders were present, the rational expectations model again describes closing prices reasonably well. When there were no insiders, there is no information for the market to aggregate. However, as uninformed traders do not know of the absence of insiders it is possible for them to misinterpret the behavior of 16 Friedman, et al. (1984) introduced a futures market for an asset that endures for three trading periods. They report that futures markets stabilize spot prices and help facilitate the leakage of insider information.
other uniformed traders as revealing insider information. If an uninformed trader acts on such a mistake, this can serve as a signal to other uninformed traders thereby creating an information "mirage." However, sustained mirages were only observed in 4 of the 47 periods where such mirages are possible suggesting that information markets are not very susceptible to this phenomenon, which is good news for the functioning prediction markets.
Manipulation
In any market, a trader may want to manipulate the price so that he or she can subsequently take advantage of the price. For example, a trader would like to push the price of an asset down so that she could cheaply purchase a large volume, which could be sold at a profit once the price has recovered. Veiga and Vorsatz (2010) find evidence that asset market prices can be manipulated in the short run under certain conditions. In their markets there are both informed and uninformed traders, but each trader's type is private information. Thus, when a robot trader is introduced with the strategy of buying early and selling late regardless of profitability, uninformed traders cannot tell the buying behavior is not being driven by the informed traders. When the asset should have a high price this strategy pushes prices towards the correct level, but when the asset should have a low price this strategy does have a transitory effect. The automated strategy proved profitable, but still Veiga and Vorsatz (2010) report that "The presence of the robot trader does not affect the last contract price significantly." (p. 385.).
Prediction markets also face the danger that a manipulator may successfully alter the price so that policy makers who are using the aggregated information will be misled. Returning to the example of the PAM proposed by DARPA, if a terrorist could mislead the Department of Defense about how to allocate resources then such markets are of little value for national security. The same is true for other prediction markets that are taken as inputs to other decision making problems, but the imagery is not as stark.
In a direct test with incentives for manipulation, Hanson et al. (2006) create a laboratory information market in which an asset has three initially equally likely dividends (0, 40 and 100).
As in Plott and Sunder (1988) , some participants have information that one of the dividends is not available (e.g. "not 40") and other participants have information that another dividend is not available (e.g. "not 0"). Together participants would have full information about the actual outcome. For obvious reasons, they call this their replication treatment (RT). They contrast this condition with a treatment in which there are known manipulators who get rewarded not only on their portfolio outcome but also with a bonus based on the median contract price for the period. The higher the median contract price, the higher the manipulator's bonus in this manipulation treatment (MT). Figure 4 shows the price results of these experiments. Hanson et al. (2006) find that manipulators submit higher bids than non-manipulators (in line with their incentives), but they have no effect on the information aggregation properties of the market because non-manipulators tend to accept contracts at lower prices. It is these countervailing strategies that stymie manipulation attempts. In a follow-up study Oprea et al. (2007) The uninformed outside forecasters in this market are rewarded if they accurately forecast the state after the market closes. The black line in the above figure shows the predicted forecast from a fully informed Bayesian. To this setting, they introduce manipulators who are given a target randomly selected from {0,100}. The manipulators are rewarded based on both their profits in the market and how far off the average forecast (of the three forecasters) was relative to the manipulator's target. Figure 6 shows how well the forecaster performed on each treatment. They find that manipulators try to manipulate prices, but the forecasts are not impaired. This result is highly encouraging in that forecasters were able to use the market to improve their predictions and that manipulation attempts did not significantly impact this process in a negative way. (Oprea et al. 2007) In an attempt to stress test the robustness of this manipulation process, Deck et al. (2012) note that the Oprea et al. design does not measure the intensity of the forecaster's beliefs. Thus, their design has forecasters investing in which state they believe will occur. As payoffs are quadratic, forecasters have a direct incentive to reveal their beliefs. Further, Deck et al. argue that the incentives of the manipulators have been heretofore relatively weak because 1.
rewards from successful manipulation may be offset by losses from trading activities and 2.
with multiple manipulators there is pressure to free rider. To address these two points, at most a single manipulator is active in any period in Deck, et al and the manipulator is only compensated based on how well she fools uninformed forecasters (i.e. manipulators were not paid on their portfolio). Finally, the manipulator is well-heeled so she is not cash constrained.
In other respects Deck et al. follows Oprea et al except that traders could create shares by setting aside enough cash to cover the maximum possible dividend payment. In the treatments without manipulators, they affirm the result that forecasters can exploit information in the market to make predictions that are better than random guessing. This suggests that fixed supply of shares that has characterized most prediction market studies is not necessary.
However, when manipulators are present, the forecasters do not better than random guessing, clearly demonstrating the destructive nature that a manipulator can do with sufficient incentive and wherewithal. Deck et al. do identify a silver lining: manipulators increase trade volume and information can be gleaned from the excess bids or asks in the market. Still, more research is needed to investigate how forecaster, traders, and manipulators might alter their behavior if it is common knowledge that previous work has identified that manipulators increase volume but information remains in the excess bids.
Future Work
To date, lab experiments have shown that markets do a reasonably good job of aggregating and/or disseminating information. This parallels what has been observed in the field.
However, the success of prediction markets should not be construed to mean that in the lab markets provide fully aggregated information during the trading process or always outperform other means of aggregating beliefs. It is not as though prediction markets are a panacea while opinion polls and other methods are no better than random guesses. Rather, prediction markets provide a viable means for harnessing the "wisdom of crowds," at least under certain conditions such as when the number of traders is reasonably thick, the states are not too complex, the payoff structure is relatively simple, and the incentives and wherewithal to manipulate are relatively small. Clearly more research is needed to fully understand the conditions under which prediction markets are robust to manipulation attempts if such markets are going to be used as decision making inputs or for the allocation of resources. One obvious gap in the experimental literature is the case where there is heterogeneity among manipulators in terms of the optimal direction they wish to push prices. Another, more critical, gap in the literature concerns the situation in which the state is endogenous or under the control of those who can trade. Again, taking the example of the PAM markets, if the market prices were observable then a terrorist could condition an attack on a low price that indicates a low probability of attack. Of course, this would make an attack more likely when the price was low, which would drive prices up making an attack less likely which would push prices back down making an attack more likely an so on.
